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Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for Adopting a 
“Substantially Influences” Standard for Title VII and 
ADEA Liability 
TIM DAVIS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Susan, an African-American nurse, has worked for a large group of 
physicians for nearly twenty years and is nearing the end of her career.  
Susan’s boss has recently retired and has been replaced by a man with an 
animus toward African-Americans.  This has put Susan in a precarious 
situation. 
Instead of overtly discriminating against her, Susan’s supervisor com-
plains to the large medical practice’s personnel committee that Susan’s 
work is substandard and she no longer is a productive worker.  The com-
mittee, based on the supervisor’s report, fires Susan. 
When Susan goes to court to assert her right not to be discriminated 
against, she may face a very daunting challenge: proving that she was fired 
because of1 her race and not because of the errant personnel committee’s 
decision.  This article is about the different answers courts give to Susan’s 
problem: whether she may vindicate her rights under Title VII when the 
personnel committee itself harbored no discriminatory bias. 
Many courts have considered the question.2  Two courts, the Seventh 
Circuit in Shager v. Upjohn Co.,3 and the Fourth Circuit in Hill v. Lock-
  
 * The Lawrence Firm, Covington, Kentucky; J.D., Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Highland 
Heights, Kentucky; B.A, Harding University, Searcy, Arkansas. 
 1. This “because of” language is required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 2. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 289 (4th Cir. 2004) (giving a 
long list of cases on point).  The U.S. Supreme Court was recently scheduled to hear arguments on this 
issue in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. BCI Coca-Cola Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 
476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007).  The question on certiorari was to be 
“[u]nder what circumstances is an employer liable under federal antidiscrimination laws based on a 
subordinate’s discriminatory animus, where the person(s) who actually made the adverse employment 
decision admittedly harbored no discriminatory motive toward the impacted employee.”  Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 1, BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm’n, 127 S.Ct. 852 (Sept. 5, 2006) (No. 06-341).  However, the case, scheduled to be argued on 
April 18, 2007, was dismissed by the parties on April 12, 2007.  See BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
L.A. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 127 S. Ct. 1931 (2007).  Eleven days later, the Court 
denied certiorari for a case presenting the same issue.  See Sawicki v. Morgan State Univ., 170 F. 
App’x 271 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2095 (2007).  
File: Davis - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 2 Created on:  12/6/2007 4:36:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2007 11:12:00 PM 
248 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 2 
 
heed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.4 provide the best synopsis of the 
differing views on this point.  The Seventh Circuit held that where a per-
sonnel committee acted as the “cat’s paw” for the discriminating supervi-
sor, its innocence would not shield the employer from liability.5  The court 
adopted the cat’s paw analogy from one of Aesop’s fables: 
A Monkey and a Cat lived in the same family, and it was hard to 
tell which was the greater thief.  One day, as they were roaming 
together, they spied some chestnuts roasting in the ashes of a fire.  
“Come,” said the cunning Monkey, “we shall not go dinnerless to-
day.  Your claws are better than mine for the purpose; pull the 
chestnuts out of the ashes, and you shall have half.”  Puss pulled 
them out, burning her paws very much in doing so.  When she had 
stolen every one, she turned to the Monkey for her share of the 
booty; but, to her chagrin, she found no chestnuts, for he had eaten 
them all.  A thief cannot be trusted even by another thief.6 
The Seventh Circuit analogized the personnel committee to the “cat’s 
paw.”  By doing the monkey’s “dirty work,” the cat committed the mon-
key’s crime for him and allowed the monkey to escape unharmed and un-
punished.  In the same way, the committee can implement a biased em-
ployee’s discriminatory animus and thus allow the employee and the com-
pany to escape unpunished.  The Seventh Circuit rejected this outcome and 
held that “cat’s-paw” discrimination would not shield an employer from 
liability. 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the approach adopted by the Sev-
enth Circuit.  It held that the committee’s ignorance will establish its inno-
cence and provide a shield from liability.7  In fact, the court noted that even 
if the discriminating employee had a “substantial influence” on the deci-
sion makers, liability still would not attach.8 
The most significant effect of these decisions comes in how employers 
carry out their business decisions with respect to terminations.  If the em-
ployers work in a circuit where courts interpret the law much like the 
Fourth Circuit, employers may make all of their decisions through commit-
tees who thus insulate the company from liability and leave employees 
who have been victimized by discrimination without a remedy. 
  
 3. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 4. 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004).   
 5. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405. 
 6. The Monkey and the Cat, Aesop’s Phrases, No. 88, available at http://www.geocities.co.jp/ 
bookend/9563/idiom/MONKEY_AND_THE_CAT.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). 
 7. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291. 
 8. Id. 
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This article agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the em-
ployer should be held liable when a personnel committee relies on the bi-
ased report of a supervisor.  Unfortunately, however, the Seventh Circuit’s 
application of agency principles to achieve this outcome may result in 
“cat’s paw” liability not attaching when the person reporting to a personnel 
committee is not a supervisor, but is instead a non-employee such as a co-
worker or an independent contractor or a customer.  This article urges 
courts to adopt a “substantial influence” standard by which an employer 
would be liable whenever a biased report to a personnel committee or other 
ultimate decision maker has a “substantial influence” on the committee’s 
decision to take an adverse employment action against an employee.  Un-
der this approach, the employer should be held responsible for any dis-
criminatory results whenever its ultimate decision maker takes adverse 
employment action against an employee based upon the animus-tinged 
reports of any person.  This approach is fully consistent with the plain lan-
guage of the antidiscrimination statutes and with Supreme Court precedent, 
and provides the broadest possible protection to employees that have been 
discriminated against. 
Part II of this article provides the legal background that courts use to 
interpret this issue.  It considers common law agency principles and the 
statutory text of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes.  Part III 
examines the approaches to the conflict the two courts have taken, which 
have placed them on opposite ends of the spectrum.  Part IV analyzes these 
approaches and advocates for an interpretation of the law that protects vic-
tims of discrimination and thus furthers the purpose of the nation’s antidis-
crimination laws.  Part V concludes this article. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Both common law and statutory law guide the decision to impose li-
ability in the context of a personnel committee acting on a biased em-
ployee’s recommendation.  Common law provides basic agency principles 
which, when adopted, will impute liability on the employer for the wrongs 
of the agent/employee.  Additionally, the text of Title VII defines terms 
that are useful in the analysis.  An examination of both of these areas of 
law is helpful in setting the stage for the ultimate decision on this issue. 
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A. Common Law Agency Principles 
At common law, the employer is liable for the intentional torts of its 
employees, so long as those torts are committed in furtherance or within 
the scope of the employee’s employment.9  The Restatement (Third) of 
Agency adopted this principle and refers to it by its traditional name, “re-
spondeat superior.”10 
Respondeat superior is a Latin phrase meaning “let the superior an-
swer.”  In many respects, that is the intent of the nation’s antidiscrimina-
tion laws—the company alone answers for an employee’s conduct because 
an incorporated company can only act through its agents and employees.11  
Although this principle derives from the common law, courts typically 
employ it in cases of statutorily-created torts because a statute rarely sets 
out all the supplementary doctrines within its text that will govern the 
case’s outcome.12 
Use of the principle in this way may lead to problems or conflicts be-
tween the common law and the statute.  The drafters of the most recent 
Agency Restatement recognized this point: “The third type of [common 
law/statutory] relationship . . . occurs when a court incorporates common-
law doctrine in its construction of a statute but modifies or varies the doc-
trine in light of the court’s understanding of the statute’s purpose or broad-
er policy context.”13  Indeed, the drafters cite Title VII jurisprudence as an 
area where agency principles are often employed but may be tweaked or 
modified to fit the court’s overall view of the outcome of the case.14  So, it 
seems that, although the agency principles that will give rise to liability in 
employment discrimination cases are important, they are not immutable.  
B. The Statutory Text of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) 
Beyond merely mentioning that agency principles and statutory poli-
cies may collide, the drafters of the Agency Restatement also noted that 
where a statute does not define terms, the common law understanding of 
those terms is likely the one that the statute’s authors intended.15  However, 
  
 9. R.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 649, 657 (1872). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
 11. North v. Madison Area Ass’n for Retarded Citizens-Developmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
 12. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 541 (1999) (using agency principles to 
govern the applicability of punitive damages in Title VII cases). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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in the case of Title VII and the ADEA,16 the term “employer” is defined 
within the statutory text: 
The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . 
.17 
The term “agent” is not defined in either statute.18  Thus, the courts have 
been left with the task of determining, based on the definition above, when 
an employer is liable for the wrongs of its “agents.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court has remarked that the definition in these stat-
utes is not meant to be all-encompassing, and that it “surely evinces intent 
to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under 
Title VII are to be held responsible.”19  In Meritor, a bank employee al-
leged her supervisor was sexually harassing her.20  The Court considered 
whether agency principles would allow an employer, in this case, a bank, 
to be held responsible for such actions by its employees.21  The Court 
turned to agency principles.  It rejected a broad rule that would automati-
cally make employers liable for every instance of sexual harassment be-
cause the definition within Title VII is somewhat self-limiting.22  The 
Court nevertheless allowed the employee to continue her claim because it 
ultimately concluded that the supervisor was an agent of the bank.23 
The Court again considered agency principles in Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth.24  The Court noted that no particular state law of agency 
would apply in determinations under Title VII.25  Instead, courts should use 
the general common law of agency in order to give the terms uniform 
meaning.26  When discussing whether an employee violates Title VII with 
the purpose of furthering the business of the employer, the Court cited 
  
 16. Because of the definition and policies identical to both statutes, this paper considers only Title 
VII and the ADEA here to provide a more concise analysis for the reader.  Certainly though, these 
principles have applications in other areas of employment law.  See, e.g., Iduoze v. McDonald’s Corp., 
268 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (utilizing the “cat’s paw” analysis for an Americans with Dis-
abilities Act claim). 
 17. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also 29 U.S.C. § 630.   
 19. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 20. Id. at 59–60. 
 21. Id. at 72. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 72–73. 
 24. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 25. Id. at 754–55. 
 26. Id. 
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cases on both sides of the line.27  The Court solved the agency question by 
adopting the “tangible employment action” standard.28  When a harasser 
takes a “tangible employment action” against the employee, the harasser 
has met all of the common law requirements for imposing liability on the 
employer.29  The Court defined tangible employment action: 
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervi-
sor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordi-
nates.  A tangible employment decision requires an official act of 
the enterprise, a company act.  The decision in most cases is docu-
mented in official company records, and may be subject to review 
by higher level supervisors.30 
In defining a tangible employment action as an “official act of the enter-
prise,” the Court favorably cited Shager.31  For purposes of this article’s 
analysis, when an employer fires an employee, it makes a tangible em-
ployment action.32 
Post-Ellerth, lower courts considered whether the Ellerth decision ap-
plied beyond the sexual harassment context to other instances of harass-
ment and violations of Title VII.  The courts concluded that it did and ap-
plied the holding in a number of broad contexts.33  From these cases it is 
clear that Title VII provides the starting point for the agency analysis with 
its textual definition of “employer.”  However, when courts need more 
detailed principles, they turn to the common law of agency to guide their 
analysis.  This was the path taken by both the Shager and Hill courts, as 
seen below. 
  
 27. Id. at 756–57. 
 28. Id. at 761. 
 29. Id. at 761–62. 
 30. Id. at 762. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 761.  
 33. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 593 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that “it appears that the Court [in Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998)] intended to apply these same agency principles to all vicarious liability inquiries under 
Title VII for acts by supervisors, including racial discrimination”); Wright-Simmons v. City of Okla. 
City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[a]lthough Burlington [v. Ellerth] and 
Faragher involved sexual harassment, the principles established in those cases apply with equal force 
to this case of racial harassment . . . .”); Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687–88 (8th Cir. 
1998) (applying Faragher to a harassment claim under the ADA); see also Crawford v. Medina Gen. 
Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating, pre-Ellerth and Faragher, that “[t]he elements and 
burden of proof are the same, regardless of the discrimination context in which the claim arises”); 
Harrison v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co., 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating 
pre-Ellerth and Faragher that “the elements and burden of proof that a Title VII plaintiff must meet are 
the same for racially charged harassment as for sexually charged harassment”). 
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III.  APPROACHES TO THE CONFLICT 
As discussed above, many courts have considered whether an em-
ployer will be liable for a personnel committee that acts on the biased rec-
ommendation of one of its employees.  The two cases discussed here pro-
vide the best synopsis of the two competing answers to the question and 
are thus the most appropriate for review. 
A. The Narrow Approach 
The Fourth Circuit case of Hill allowed a recovery only in very limited 
circumstances.34  Ethel Hill worked for Lockheed Martin as a sheet metal 
mechanic.35  Her job required her to perform various modifications to air-
craft at numerous military bases across the country.36  As a result, she was 
part of a team that traveled to perform these modifications.37  Her supervi-
sor often did not travel with the team.38  Instead, a “point person” super-
vised the workers on the team and served as the contact with the military 
base.39  This person was also responsible for making sure that all of Lock-
heed’s safety protocols and quality requirements were satisfied.40 
Hill received three reprimands for safety violations in the last few 
months of her employment with Lockheed.41  These three reprimands were 
enough, under Lockheed’s “standard operating procedures,” to terminate 
Hill.42  She did not contest that procedure but alleged that Ed Fultz, the 
safety inspector at one of the bases at which Hill had worked, was hostile 
to older women which thus led to his filing of safety violations against 
Hill.43  She pointed to statements Fultz made, such as calling her a “useless 
old lady” who needed to be retired, a “troubled old lady,” and a “damn 
woman” as evidence of his animus.44  Hill argued that Fultz’s dislike of 
older women, along with his desire to retaliate against her when she com-
plained to her supervisor about Fultz’s comments, led Fultz to report ad-
mittedly valid infractions that resulted in her second and third reprimands 
  
 34. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 35. Id. at 282. 
 36. Id.   
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 283. 
 44. Id. 
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and which, when combined with her first reprimand, served as the basis for 
her termination under Lockheed’s procedure.45 
After the district court awarded a summary judgment in Lockheed’s 
favor, the Fourth Circuit, en banc, addressed the question of who is a “de-
cisionmaker” for Title VII purposes.46  The court essentially mirrored the 
discussion above: it noted the definition within the text of Title VII of 
“employer” and set out the agency principles discussed in Ellerth and Me-
ritor.47  The Fourth Circuit upheld the notion of the tangible employment 
action and said that when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action 
against a subordinate, “it would be implausible to interpret agency princi-
ples to allow an employer to escape liability.”48 
The court then discussed other Supreme Court precedent that stands 
for the proposition that an employer can still be held liable in a similar 
case, “so long as the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to establish that 
the subordinate was the one ‘principally responsible’ for, or the ‘actual 
decisionmaker’ behind, the action.”49   
The Fourth Circuit rejected Hill’s attempts to argue that as long as an 
employee “substantially influences” the committee’s decision, liability will 
attach.50  The court, without much commentary, stated that it believed the 
statutes and “controlling precedents” do not allow such a broad view.51  
Next, the court rejected cases like Shager that adopt the “cat’s paw” theory 
because “they have not always described the theory in consistent ways, and 
rarely have they done so after a discussion of the agency principles from 
which the theory emerged and that limit its application.”52 
After noting that Title VII and the ADEA do not only provide liability 
for the decisions of “formal decisionmakers,” the court uttered the pro-
nouncement that condemned Hill’s claim: 
[W]e decline to endorse a construction of the discrimination stat-
utes that would allow a biased subordinate who has no supervisory 
or disciplinary authority and who does not make the final or formal 
employment decision to become a decisionmaker simply because 
he had a substantial influence on the ultimate decision or because 
  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 286. 
 47. Id. at 287–88. 
 48. Id. at 287. 
 49. Id. at 288–89 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151–52 (2000)).  
 50. Id. at 289. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 290. 
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he has played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse em-
ployment decision.53 
Because the court would only allow a recovery for the biased actions of the 
“actual decisionmaker,” the court affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Lockheed.54 
B. The Cat’s Paw 
The “cat’s paw” theory originated in the Seventh Circuit case of Shag-
er.  The Upjohn Company was the successor company to the Asgrow Seed 
Company, for whom Ralph Shager sold seeds.55  Shager began working for 
Asgrow when he was fifty years old.56  Beyond working as a seed sales-
man, Shager supervised the company’s workforce in Wisconsin.57 
Shager’s supervisor was John Lehnst, who was thirty-five at the time.58  
Lehnst hired a new sales associate for Wisconsin and divided the state into 
two territories, a northern and southern portion.59  Shager contended that 
the territories should be divided into an eastern and western portion be-
cause it was more difficult to make sales in the northern region.60  Lehnst 
rejected Shager’s contention and assigned Shager to the northern region.61 
Despite not providing enough sales to justify a third representative, 
Lehnst actively recruited and hired a third representative for Wisconsin 
who was twenty-nine.62  Lehnst was aware that he would eventually have 
to terminate one of the representatives because of Wisconsin’s poor sales, 
but when he hired the new salesman, he simply divided the state into three 
territories.63 
This division made it difficult for Shager to meet his required sales 
quotas, but he nonetheless exceeded the goals, even in the depleted north-
ern region.64  The twenty-nine year old manager failed to meet his quotas.65  
Nevertheless, Lehnst rated Shager’s performance as marginal in a perform-
ance evaluation while he made excuses for the younger salesman’s poor 
  
 53. Id. at 291. 
 54. Id. at 297–98. 
 55. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 399 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 399. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 400. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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performance.66  Lehnst placed Shager on probation for apparent deficien-
cies in collecting accounts receivable and for poor management of sales-
men in Shager’s territory.67  Lehnst finally recommended to Asgrow’s Ca-
reer Path Committee that Shager should be fired for the deficiencies.  The 
committee accepted the recommendation and terminated Shager.68 
When Shager left, Lehnst divided the state into an eastern and western 
division as Shager had recommended.69  Shager pointed to a number of 
statements by Lehnst that showed that Lehnst disapproved of older work-
ers, such as “[t]hese older people don’t much like or much care for us baby 
boomers, but there isn’t much they can do about it,”70 and “the old guys 
know how to get around things.”71 
The district court granted summary judgment in Upjohn’s favor.  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit began its discussion with a recitation of the 
basic agency principles and the Meritor case.72  The court recited the 
common law rule, also applicable to statutory torts such as antidiscrimina-
tion laws, that an employer is liable for the intentional torts of its employ-
ees, committed in furtherance of their employment.73  Lehnst, the court 
reasoned, was Asgrow’s agent because he was an employee of Asgrow and 
because his reports to the personnel committee were in furtherance of his 
employment.  Thus, Lehnst’s discriminatory animus could be imputed to 
Asgrow. 74 
By contrast, the personnel committee, according to the Seventh Cir-
cuit, was a mere rubber stamp.  The court noted that a personnel committee 
is likely to defer to the managers who have more “hands on” contact with 
the employees.75  With such deference, the committee can “act[] as the 
conduit of . . . [the supervisor’s] prejudice . . .” and the supervisor can 
abuse his power by allowing his or her discriminatory beliefs to affect his 
or her recommendation to the committee.76  Ultimately, the court analo-
gized, the committee acted as a “nonconductor” and is no more culpable or 
responsible than a secretary who types an employee’s discharge papers.77  
  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 400. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 405. 
 73. Id. at 404. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 405. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
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The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and al-
lowed Shager to proceed with his claim.78 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Part analyzes the dichotomous approaches described above.  It al-
so advocates for a theory that provides the greatest amount of protection to 
employees who have been the victims of discrimination. 
A. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Both Approaches  
As is the case in all circuit splits, one circuit will eventually be right 
and another will eventually be wrong.79  That does not mean that one ap-
proach is without merit whereas the other is entirely correct.  Rather, there 
is often some good and some bad to both views—especially with this issue. 
1. The Fourth Circuit Approach 
The Fourth Circuit view has been widely criticized for being inconsis-
tent and just plain wrong.80  However, there are some aspects to its juris-
prudence that are correct.  Often overlooked by a commentator’s rush to 
criticize an otherwise bad case is the fact that the Fourth Circuit will still 
impose liability on a committee that does not engage in any investigation 
but merely takes the supervisor’s word as the only evidence needed for its 
determination.81  Surely this is a step in the right direction.  The court 
could have cut off liability any time a neutral committee makes the ulti-
mate decision, but the court still recognized those cases where employers 
would make an end run around the law and thus provided for liability in 
this limited circumstance. 
However, this approach presents a problem.  This “independent inves-
tigation” standard may have the effect of creating a “revolving door” where 
a committee’s investigation could be considered complete as long as the 
committee interrogated the biased employee on his or her reasons for seek-
ing to terminate the protected employee.  If the committee did that, perhaps 
  
 78. Id. at 406. 
 79. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (detailing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent certiorari 
activity on this issue). 
 80. See, e.g., Ali Razzaghi, Comment, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.: “Sub-
stantially Influencing” the Fourth Circuit to Change its Standard for Imputing Employer Liability for 
the Biases of a Non-Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1709, 1730 (2005) (noting that “[e]ven the 
cases cited by the majority are at odds with the Fourth Circuit’s previous interpretation”). 
 81. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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it would be all that is required to protect the employer and thus erode the 
last vestige of protection available to employees in this situation in the 
Fourth Circuit. 
2. The Seventh Circuit Approach 
Of the two approaches, the Seventh Circuit’s “cat’s paw” theory best 
enunciates the agency principles pronounced by the Supreme Court in its 
sexual harassment cases.82  However, because the Seventh Circuit case 
only deals with agency principles in the context of a supervisor reporting to 
a committee, it is unclear what the outcome would be in a case where the 
committee hears the report of an employee at the same level as the one 
eventually fired.  Nonetheless, recent cases that have considered that exact 
circumstance still employ the “cat’s paw” theory, even in cases of same-
level reporting.83 
In Shager, the Seventh Circuit explicitly predicated its finding of li-
ability on the fact that the supervisor recommending discharge to the per-
sonnel committee was an employee and therefore an agent of the em-
ployer.84  But what if the biased person reporting to a personnel committee 
or other decisionmaker is neither a supervisor nor fellow employee, but 
instead an independent contractor or a customer?  Such individuals would 
not be statutory “employees” under the antidiscrimination statutes, and 
therefore according to the Seventh Circuit’s application of agency princi-
ples would not be the employer’s “agents” for purposes of imputing liabil-
ity.  Thus, an employee fired by a personnel committee which had relied 
on the animus-tinged report of a non-employee would have no remedy 
under the antidiscrimination laws.  As such, while the Seventh Circuit in-
tended the “cat’s paw” theory to extend antidiscrimination protection 
broadly, its application of agency principles results in a relatively limited 
scope of antidiscrimination protection.  A new approach is needed to ex-
tend antidiscrimination protection to circumstances in which a personnel 
committee or other decisionmaker takes adverse employment action 
against an employee because of the animus-tinged reports of independent 
contractors, customers, or other non-employees. 
  
 82. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 790 (1998). 
 83. See Young v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) (deciding case using “cat’s paw” 
theory where one worker reported his co-worker to human resources). 
 84. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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B. Beyond the “Cat’s Paw” 
There is a standard beyond the “cat’s paw” that may provide the best 
test for imposing liability upon an employer for a personnel committee’s 
decision.  Ethel Hill asked the Fourth Circuit to adopt a standard of “sub-
stantial influence” so that when a biased employee makes a report to the 
committee that has a “substantial influence” on the committee—even if the 
committee makes its own investigation—liability is still appropriate.85  The 
Fourth Circuit rejected the standard.86  Nonetheless, this article argues that 
courts should adopt a variation on this standard and find that an employer 
is liable whenever a biased report to a personnel committee, or other ulti-
mate decisionmaker, has a substantial influence on a decision to take an 
adverse employment action against an employee. 
As described above, the problem with the “cat’s paw” theory is that the 
Seventh Circuit’s application of agency principles would not permit the 
imposition of liability on an employer when a personnel committee takes 
an adverse employment action against an employee because of a discrimi-
natory report of a non-employee.  This article argues that an employer 
should be liable whenever an animus-tinged report, from any source, 
whether employee or not, has a substantial influence on a decision to take 
an adverse employment action against an employee.  This approach is fully 
consistent with agency principles.87 
The personnel committee is comprised of employees who unques-
tionably are agents of the employer for purposes of Title VII liability.  
They are the employer’s agents because they are employees acting within 
the scope of their employment.  The Restatement (Third) of Agency speci-
fies that “an employee acts within the scope of employment when perform-
ing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct sub-
ject to the employer’s control.”88  If an employer gives a personnel com-
mittee authority to take or recommend adverse employment actions, then 
the committee’s actions in furtherance of that authority are “assigned by 
the employer” and therefore within the scope of the committee members’ 
employment.  Members of the personnel committee also are acting within 
the scope of employment when they act carelessly or mistakenly, or fail to 
act at all, on matters assigned to them by the employer.89 
  
 85. Hill, 354 F.3d at 289. 
 86. Id. 
 87. I am indebted to Roger Billings, who suggested the argument that follows and Richard Bales for 
its further articulation. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). 
 89. Id. cmt. c (“An employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment when it constitutes 
performance of work assigned to the employee by the employer.  The fact that the employee performs 
the work carelessly does not take the employee’s conduct outside the scope of employment, nor does 
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This is important because the duties owed by a principal to an agent 
include: the duties of “care, competence, and diligence”;90 and “to provide 
information.”91  The “information” that an agent is under a duty to provide 
includes information that the agent does not know, but should.92  In other 
words, the agent may be under a duty to investigate in order to obtain in-
formation that is not readily available to the agent.93  The “may,” of course, 
implies a converse “may not.”  However, the “may not” appears to apply 
when a principal has explicitly withheld a duty to investigate, or when it is 
ambiguous as to whether the principal expects the agent to investigate.  On 
the other hand, when an employer explicitly gives a personnel committee 
the authority to investigate employee misconduct or poor performance and 
to take adverse employment action against employees who have engaged 
in misconduct or poor performance, then the duty to investigate is explicit 
and is fully consistent with agency principles. 
This article argues that a personnel committee’s duties to investigate 
and inform are not properly discharged by merely taking a third party (such 
as a customer or an independent contractor) or co-worker at his or her 
word.  In other words, if a customer or independent contractor or co-
worker complains about an employee to a personnel committee, the per-
sonnel committee is duty-bound under agency principles to conduct an 
investigation to ensure that the report is accurate and is not tinged with 
discriminatory animus.  If the personnel committee fires the employee 
without conducting such an investigation, then two consequences follow. 
The first consequence is that the employer is liable to the fired em-
ployee.  This is so because, as discussed above, the personnel committee 
was acting within the scope of its employment when it fired the employee 
without an adequate investigation.  As such, it was acting as the em-
ployer’s agent.  Title VII and the antidiscrimination statutes forbid em-
ployers from discriminating against employees “because of” protected 
characteristics such as race, sex, age, and disability,94 and the statutes spec-
ify that employers are liable for the conduct of their agents.95  If a person-
nel committee relies on an animus-tinged report to fire an employee, then 
  
the fact that the employee otherwise makes a mistake in performing the work . . . .  An employee’s 
failure to take action may also be conduct within the scope of employment.”). 
 90. Id. § 8.08. 
 91. Id. § 8.11. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. cmt. d. (“If an agent fails to provide information to the principal that is material to deci-
sions that the principal will make, the agent may not have acted with the diligence and care reasonably 
to be expected of an agent in a particular position.  An agent’s duty of care may require the agent to 
obtain information that is material to the principal’s interests.”) (emphasis added). 
 94. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
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that employee has been fired “because of” discriminatory animus and 
should be protected by the antidiscrimination laws. 
The second consequence is that the personnel committee is likely to be 
liable under the law of agency to the employer.  As described above, the 
personnel committee owes the employer a duty of care, competence, and 
diligence, as well as a duty to provide information which encompasses a 
duty of investigation.  An agent that fails to discharge its duties to a princi-
pal is liable under the law of agency to the principal.  Thus, while indi-
viduals generally are not personally liable under the antidiscrimination 
laws for discriminatory actions they take on behalf of their employer,96 
they may be liable to their employer under agency principles for failure to 
properly discharge their agency duties. 
The “substantial influence” approach provides better results than the 
Seventh Circuit approach for three reasons.  First, it is more consistent with 
the text of the antidiscrimination statutes.  Second, it is more consistent 
with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  Third, it is the best policy approach. 
1. “Substantial Influence” Theory’s Consistency with Statutory Text 
Title VII and the antidiscrimination statutes forbid employers from 
discriminating against employees “because of” protected characteristics 
such as race, sex, age, and disability.97  If a personnel committee relies on 
an animus-tinged report to fire an employee, then that employee has been 
fired “because of” discriminatory animus and should be protected by the 
antidiscrimination laws. 
The Fourth Circuit in Hill held that even though employment discrimi-
nation existed, it wasn’t the “employer” doing the discriminating, since the 
personnel committee which was the ultimate decisionmaker did not itself 
harbor discriminatory animus.98  However, the text of the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes define “employer” as including “any agent” of an employer.  
As discussed above, the personnel committee is unquestionably an agent of 
the employer.  If it relies on animus-tinged reports supplied to it by others, 
its reliance should serve as the basis for imputing liability to the employer 
regardless of whether the committee itself harbored discriminatory animus. 
  
 96. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 97. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).   
 98. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 289 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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2. “Substantial Influence” Theory’s Consistency with U.S. Supreme 
Court Precedent 
When a biased co-worker is “principally responsible” for an em-
ployee’s termination, liability is appropriate.99  In Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products., Inc.,100 a biased employee secured the termination of 
an older employee by complaining that the older worker had falsified work 
documents.101  The U.S. Supreme Court held that liability could attach to 
the employer because the biased employee had essentially acted as the 
“actual decisionmaker.”102  In fact, the person who actually terminated the 
older worker was the biased employee’s wife, and the biased employee 
was able to have considerable influence over her.103 
The difference between one who is “principally responsible” and one 
who is a “substantial influence” is merely semantic.  Reeves provides 
enough authority to support the “substantial influence” theory on its facts 
alone: the decisionmaker was not the biased employee, yet the biased em-
ployee was in a position to have a substantial influence over the decision-
maker.  Such a scenario can certainly arise beyond the husband/wife con-
text.  Perhaps the committee members have a “favorite employee” from 
whom they prefer to hear personnel reports.  If such is the case, the favored 
employee will yield tremendous power and could act as a “substantial in-
fluence” or be “principally responsible” for a decision made by the com-
mittee. 
Ultimately, the Reeves decision, with its “principally responsible” lan-
guage, provides an implicit endorsement of the “substantially influences” 
standard.  Although the language used is different, the substance behind 
both standards is the same: an employer should not be free from liability 
when an employee, in a position to exert influence over the employer, 
swayed the employer’s decision and thereby induced the employee to en-
gage in discriminatory conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination stat-
utes. 
3. “Substantial Influence” Theory is Sound Policy 
As a matter of policy, using a “substantial influence” theory provides 
better, more consistent results.  The nation’s antidiscrimination laws were 
intended to shelter members of protected classes from discrimination.  
  
 99. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 100. Id. at 151. 
 101. Id. at 137–38. 
 102. Id. at 152–53. 
 103. Id. at 152. 
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Therefore, any interpretation of the statutes should be as broad as possible 
to provide as much protection as possible in order to further the statutes’ 
goal.  The “substantial influence” test does exactly that. 
When bias plays any role in an employee’s termination, the employee 
should have a cause of action.  This is true whether the biased individual is 
the one making the ultimate decision or if he or she is the one exerting 
influence on the decisionmaker.  If not, employers will take advantage of 
this “loophole” in the law and make termination decisions only through 
personnel committees—a result the Shager court predicted.104 
A “substantial influence” theory also mirrors the analysis provided 
elsewhere in Title VII.  Under a “substantial influence” analysis, the em-
ployer could still be liable as long as the committee used the discriminatory 
employee’s report as a factor in the termination or other adverse action 
against the employee, as opposed to the only factor.  This is similar to Title 
VII’s mixed motive analysis that provides for liability as long as a pro-
tected characteristic was “a motivating factor” in the adverse action taken 
against the employee.105 
Finally, the “substantial influence” theory puts the duty to investigate 
employee misconduct precisely where agency principles would put it: on 
the personnel committee to which the employer has delegated its authority 
to investigate and to take adverse employment actions.  Moreover, this 
allocation of the duty is good policy because the personnel committee, by 
virtue of its authority to conduct an investigation, is in the best position of 
all the parties to find out whether a negative report about an employee is 
legitimate or whether it is tinged with discriminatory animus. 
In short, the “cat’s paw” theory is clearly superior to the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s analysis, and the “substantial influence” theory is superior to the 
“cat’s paw” theory.  Using the “substantial influence” standard provides a 
quick analysis for the fact finder.  The jury or the judge need only consider 
the biased employee’s statements to the personnel committee and evaluate 
the impact those statements likely had.  If the impact is substantial, liability 
is appropriate, even if the influence was not the determinative factor.  Be-
cause courts should seek to protect employees who have been the victims 
of discrimination, the substantial influence theory should be adopted. 
  
 104. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (speculating that the personnel com-
mittee in that case could be “just a liability shield invented by lawyers”). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
If a personnel committee relies on an animus-tinged report to fire an 
employee, then that employee has been fired “because of” discriminatory 
animus and should be protected by the antidiscrimination laws.  If not, the 
purpose behind the laws—protecting certain classes of our society from 
invidious behavior—will be meaningless.  As a result, when a biased em-
ployee or other individual uses the personnel committee as a conduit for 
his or her bias, the employer should be held liable for acting as the biased 
employee’s “cat’s paw.”  Such a standard is consistent with U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent and will provide the best amount of protection to the na-
tion’s workers so that someday such a determination will no longer be nec-
essary because bias and discrimination have disappeared from America’s 
workplaces. 
